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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Appellant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah ("Blue 
Cross"), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby 
petitions the Court for rehearing and/or remanding of the 
above-captioned matter. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case involves an attack by Blue Cross on the 
constitutionality of a taxation scheme under which the 
legislature imposed a 2.25 percent tax on subscription income 
received by Blue Cross and other insurers, but exempted from 
that tax a category of insurers organized as Mutual Benefit 
Associations ("MBAs").-^ Blue Cross argued that there was no 
rational basis for classifying the MBAs differently for 
purposes of taxation, i.e., for the avowed purpose of the 
legislative classification, that of revenue raising. 
1/ This case reached the Supreme Court on an appeal by Blue 
Cross from a summary judgment granted to the State of Utah. 
That summary judgment motion, however, was a procedural aid to 
this appeal. Blue Cross initially moved for and was denied 
summary judgment. The issue was extensively brief in 
conjunction with Blue Cross* motion. The state moved for and 
was granted summary judgment with no further argument on 
briefing. Thus this appeal may be properly procedurally viewed 
as an appeal from a denial of summary judgment in favor of Blue 
Cross. 
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On July 19, 1989, this Court issued an opinion in 
which it conceded that it also could not "conceive of any 
reason for exempting [certain] MBAs from the premium tax." 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State of Utah, No. 19676 
at 16 (slip op. July 19, 1989). Despite the Court's agreement 
with Blue Cross that there was no conceivable reason justifying 
the distinction between Blue Cross and the MBAs it held that 
Blue Cross had "failed to show that it or any insurer had 
incurred any burden" as a result of the discriminatory tax. 
Slip op. at 16. The opinion appears to hold that even if an 
impermissible distinction is made by the legislature it has not 
acted in contravention of the Constitution unless "substantial" 
harm is caused to those disadvantaged by the irrational 
distinction. Slip op. at 16. 
Blue Cross respectfully submits that the Court has 
overlooked or misapprehended important facts and arguments in 
reaching that conclusion. 
Specifically, the Court has added a new legal element 
to Blue Cross' burden in attacking the constitutionality of the 
statute: it has required Blue Cross to make factual proof of 
the burden it incurred because of the legislature's 
misclassification. Blue Cross has demonstrated harm per se in 
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that it has proven it paid several million dollars of taxes 
that MBAs which are indistinguishable from it have not. 
Although no further proof should be necessary even 
under the standard set forth in the opinion in this matter, 
Blue Cross notes that the record already contains such 
additional proof. Blue Cross filed affidavits in support of 
its motion for summary judgment that set forth the proof 
required by the Court; the sufficiency of those affidavits in 
that regard was not challenged by the State. Finally, since 
this Court has in effect determined that a material issue of 
fact exists as to the competitive burden suffered by Blue Cross 
the proper dispositioning of this matter would be for the Court 
to remand the matter to the trial court in order to allow Blue 
Cross to make further factual proof demonstrating that it has 
been substantially harmed. 
II. IN ITS OPINION THE COURT ADDED A NEW ELEMENT TO 
BLUE CROSS1 BURDEN IN ATTACKING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TAXATION. 
After Blue Cross had filed, briefed, and orally argued 
its appeal in this matter this Court issued an opinion in the 
case Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 
884 (Utah 1988). In that opinion this Court rejected a 
challenge to a taxation scheme imposed by Salt Lake City 
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Corporation upon Mountain Fuel Supply. Under that scheme, 
although suppliers of natural gas and electricity as sources of 
home heating were taxed the County did not seek to impose the 
same tax on sellers of "alternative fuels" such as firewood. 
In rejecting Mountain Fuel's attack on the constitutionality of 
that scheme, the Court found that the discrimination between 
energy suppliers was justified in part because of the 
administrative inefficiency involved in tracking down suppliers 
of alternative fuels and imposing the tax upon them. Id. at 
891. The court also found that Mountain Fuel was not 
sufficiently competitively disadvantaged by having to compete 
with these untaxed suppliers of alternative fuels. Xd. at 891. 
Blue Cross' competitive position in its market is 
obviously different from that of Mountain Fuel's. The Mountain 
Fuel case is therefore misapplied to this matter. Moreover, 
this Court has apparently, without the benefit of briefing or 
oral argument by the parties, used for the first time in its 
opinion in this matter the Mountain Fuel case to add an 
additional element to the burden that must be met by a party 
attacking the constitutionality of a taxation scheme. It is no 
longer enough for a party to demonstrate that the legislature 
has imposed upon it a disadvantageous tax classification that 
is rationally unrelated to the purpose the legislature hoped to 
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achieve through the classification of entities for purposes of 
taxation. Now the party seeking to invalidate the scheme must 
demonstrate that it has been substantially disadvantaged 
competitively by the discrimination. Slip op. at 16. Blue 
Cross prepared the materials in support of its summary judgment 
motion and briefed and argued this appeal before the Court had 
imposed such a requirement - which it did for the first time in 
its opinion in this matter. It is therefore facially improper 
to sustain a summary judgment against Blue Cross because it 
failed to marshal evidence on a point the law has not 
heretofore required it to prove. This is particularly true in 
light of the Court's procedural dispositioning of this case as 
explained in Point IV, below. 
III. BLUE CROSS HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT HAS BEEN 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPETITIVELY DISADVANTAGED IN 
COMPETITION WITH THE NON-TAXED MBAS. 
Although at the time its summary judgment materials 
were filed at the trial court and this appeal was briefed and 
argued Blue Cross was not required by existing law to 
demonstrate a competitive disadvantage, it did so. First, it 
should be noted that there was no reason for Blue Cross to make 
any factual demonstration by way of affidavits. It was not 
seriously disputed by the State, and was indeed determine by 
-6-
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 The total amount of subscription tax paid by Blue Cross as 
of the date of the filing of this appeal was $1,899,614.00, In 
order to avoid the statute of limitations Blue Cross filed 
another complaint (which was from time to time amended) seeking 
refund of the taxes paid between the filing of the initial 
action and the repeal of the tax. That action sought 
$3,121,438.59, for total damage in wI iat most wou1d consider to 
be a rather "substantial" amount 
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of situations in which Blue Cross was competing head to head 
with MBAs for the same insurance business. (See attached 
Affidavit of Gene Denning). Blue Cross also submitted an 
affidavit from Dennis B. Tierney, its Senior Director of 
Actuarial Services, to the effect that the 2.25% tax must be 
directly passed on to subscribers. (See attached affidavit of 
Dennis B. Tierney). 
The Court's opinion refers to only one affidavit filed 
by Blue Cross, indicating that it possibly overlooked 
Mr. Tierney1s affidavit—a critical piece of evidence which 
links the imposition of the tax to increased Blue Cross rates 
and thus lost business. 
The State made no meaningful challenge to the adequacy 
of Mr. Denning1s affidavit but rather filed a brief 
counteraffidavit alleging that at least one small business had 
purchased its policy of insurance from an MBA rather than Blue 
Cross because of a family connection with the MBA and not a 
difference in rates. (See attached Affidavit of Delyle 
Billings). Thus, at the most, the State demonstrated that Blue 
Cross did not lose this small contract to an MBA because of the 
premium tax. In its July 19, 1989 opinion this Court found 
(presumably) Mr. Denning1s affidavit to be "conclusory" and 
incapable of demonstrating that Blue Cross had been 
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substantially harmed. Blue Cross submits that the 
characterization of that affidavit as "conclusory" is an 
obvious misapprehension of important facts, and further 
indicates that the Court failed to consider the additional 
affidavits submitted by Blue Cross. 
Perhaps more importantly, the State (to its credit) 
never challenged Blue Cross* evidence in the record below in 
support of the patently obvious proposition that paying several 
million dollars not paid by one's competitors in a fiercely 
competitive market constitutes significant harm. If the 
affidavits of Mr. Denning and others had been challenged by the 
State in the trial court on that ground, Blue Cross could have 
marshaled other affidavits or evidentiary proof at the fact 
finding stage in support of its assertions. Blue Cross has 
however been foreclosed from providing such proof by the fact 
that the affidavit was not challenged on that ground until the 
Court opinion in this appeal, at which point it was too late 
for Blue Cross to offer such additional proof. It is grossly 
unfair in fact as well as an error of law to deem Blue Cross1 
unchallenged proof insufficient at this point and to affirm the 
summary judgment against Blue Cross on that ground. See 
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (1985) (objections to 
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sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a summary judgment 
motion are waived if not raised at trial court level). 
IV. THIS COURT ERRED IN NOT REMANDING THIS MATTER TO 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
As explained above, this matter although procedurally 
taking the form of an appeal from a summary judgment granted to 
the State of Utah is really a case in which the Court has 
determined that Blue Cross was not entitled to summary judgment 
finding the tax unconstitutional because Blue Cross has failed 
in a matter of factual proof. The Court's reasoning in its 
July 19, 1989 opinion is not that the State has as a matter of 
law demonstrated valid distinctions between Blue Cross and the 
MBAs for purposes of imposing the premium tax. Indeed, the 
opinion specifically finds to the contrary. Rather, this Court 
found in effect that whether Blue Cross can demonstrate 
substantial competitive harm was suffered by it as a result of 
the legislature's improper classification remains a material 
issue of fact. The proper dispositioning of this matter is, 
therefore, to remand it so that Blue Cross can attempt to 
marshal before the finder of fact evidence demonstrating that 
it has been substantially competitively injured by the 
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irrational taxation scheme imposed by the legislature, as now 
required by the Court in its decision herein. 
Respectfully submitted this <</>*4 day 
of fX^^UAjt 1989. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
/W^t*7 ^ ^ 
in£*rf and Attorneys for 
Appellant 
ses 176/cc 
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STATE OF UTAH ,--c ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The affiant does dully depose and say that: 
My name is David R. Money. I am counsel for Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Utah and submit the foregoing 
Rehearing Petition on its behalf, I hereby certify that the 
foregoing Rehearing Petition is presented in good faith and not 
for purpose of delay. 
DATED this a/^cj day of August, 1989. 
David R. Money 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this the day of 
August, 1989, I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, to the following: 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
Stephen G. Schwendiman, Esq. 
Bryce H. Pettey, Esq. 
Mary Beth Walz, Esq. 
Assistant Attorneys General 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Affidavit of Gene A. Denning 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Michael R. Murphy, and 
David R. Money, of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD 
OF UTAH, a nonprofit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, AND UTAH 
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
GENE A. DENNING 
Civil No. C82-7742 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Gene A. Denning, being duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. I am the Senior Marketing Vice President of Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Utah (hereinafter "Blue Cross"), and 
in that capacity, I have personal knowledge of the facts set 
forth herein. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
2. Blue Cross is a non-profit health service 
corporation and in the course of its business provides payment 
for health, accident and other medically-related expenses 
incurred by its subscribers. 
3. Blue Cross is capable of offering subscribers 
essentially the same health insurance services and benefits 
as the mutual benefit associations operating in the State of 
Utah which provide such services and benefits. 
4. Since the health insurance services and benefits 
offered by Blue Cross and these mutual benefit associations are 
comparable, Blue Cross must be able to offer its subscribers 
rates which are reasonably competitive, with those offered by 
these mutual benefit associations, in order to compete with 
these mutual benefit associations for health and disability 
insurance business in Utah. Due to the highly competitive 
nature of the health insurance business in Utah, customers 
will select different insurers based on very small differences 
in the rates offered by these insurers. The subscription income 
tax assessed against Blue Cross therefore becomes an extremely 
significant factor in Blue Cross's ability to offer rafes 
competitive with those of the mutual benefit associations. 
5. In July of 1982, Blue Cross unsuccessfully bid 
against Educators Mutual Insurance Association of Utah for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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premium coverage of employees of the Tooele County School 
District. 
6. Over the course of the past few years, Blue 
Cross has unsuccessfully competed for both administration of 
and reinsurance coverage of a significant number of the approxi-
mately seven thousand city and county employees1 health benefit 
programs now covered by the Utal Local Governments Insurance 
Trust, administered by Educators Mutual Insurance Association 
of Utah, including Sevier and Duchesne Counties and Salt Lake 
City, Cedar City, Monticello and Roosevelt. 
7. Blue Cross is currently bidding against Educators 
Mutual Insurance Association of Utah for the administration of 
and reinsurance coverage of Granite School District employees1 
health benefits program. 
8. Blue Cross is currently bidding against Electric 
Mutual Benefit Association for administration of and reinsurance 
coverage of the Emery Mining Corporation employees1 health 
benefits program. 
9. In December of 1982, Blue Cross unsuccessfully 
bid against Deseret Mutual Benefit Association for coverage of 
employees of the Beneficial Life Insurance Company. 
10. Over the course of the past few years, Blue Cross 
has bid against Gem State Mutual of Utah for premium coverage 
of employees of various small businesses, with as little as two 
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employees. Some of these businesses which Blue Cross 
unsuccessfully competed against Gem State Mutual of Utah 
include the following: Great Basin GMC; Plaza Cycle; Greek 
Gardens; Bruce Electric; KZJO Radio; Metal Salvage; Slijco; 
and Ask Renee Travel. 
11. In addition to the above instances where Blue 
Cross has directly competed against the specified mutual 
benefit associations, there are a number of examples where, 
in the judgment of Blue Cross, they could successfully compete 
against the mutual benefit associations but for the added 
burden of the subscription income tax. These examples include 
a number of entities currently covered by Deseret Mutual Benefit 
Association, e.g., Bonneville International and the Deseret News; 
the cities and counties included in the Utah Local Government 
Trust under Educators Mutual Insurance Association of Utah for 
which Blue Cross has never bid; the school districts covered by 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association of Utah for which Blue 
Cross has never bid; and the many small business accounts now 
serviced by Gem State Mutual of Utah. 
12. The examples of instances where Blue Cross has 
competed or is competing with the benefit associations set 
forth in paragraphs 5 through 11 above are illustrative only 
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and not intended to be exhaustive. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 1983. 
i ' U 
Gene A. Denning 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 1st day of 
March, 1983. 
NOTARY PUSLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
l l jUcuWtL 
ua ruBLiUy 4 j "s 
Residing at: jdcJlV x/-<£. cU^uxi, j 
 LIC7 j Y''Y . ,//,JlcU 
 \ j ^W *'M Lu *&j., y&^-J 
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Michael R. Murphy, and 
David R. Money, of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD 
OF UTAH, a nonprofit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, AND UTAH 
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, 
« 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DENNIS B. TIERNEY 
Civil No. C82-7742 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Ir Dennis B. Tierney, being duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. I am the Senior Director of Actuarial Services 
for Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah (hereinafter "Blue 
Cross"), and in that capacity, I have personal knowledge of the 
facts set forth herein. 
Exhibit 6 
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2. I am responsible for determining the rates which 
Blue Cross charges its subscribers. 
3. The two and one-quarter percent subscription 
income tax assessed against Blue Cross is a factor which must 
be included in every premium-based rate established by Blue 
Cross, and constitutes a direct and noncontrollable cost of 
doing business which must be included in setting these rates. 
4. Blue Cross currently pays approximately 
$1,000,000.00 per year in the average in subscription income 
taxes. 
DATED this Ar' day of ri^U , 1983. 
"-J^scr . 
DENNIS B. TIEllNEY / 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e roe t h i s /sT day 
Of HfificM , 1 9 8 3 . 
My Commission Expires: 
9-3-54 
WUiUrtA ,& J&UU*£ . 
NOTARY PUBLIC j , j , /) j&zk$ 
R e s i d i n g a t ; J o U ' SuA; L,,^^ U/ 
5849b 
DRM 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
MARK K. BUCHI 
Division Chief 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
BRYCE M. PETTEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
LINDA LDINSTRA 
Assistant Attorney General 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-5286 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD 
OF UTAH, a nonprofit 
corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, AND UTAH 
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i AFFIDAVIT OF DELYLE BILLINGS 
i Civil No. C82-7742 
State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
If DeLyle Billings, being duly swornf depose and say: 
1. I am the owner of Plaza Cycle, 1379 West 3300 
Southf West Valley Cityf and in that capacity, I have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth herein. 
2. I am responsible for making the business 
decision concerning what company will provide insurance 
coverage for employees of Plaza Cycle. 
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3* Both Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Dtah and Gem 
State Mutual of Dtah submitted bids to Plaza Cycle, offering to 
provide insurance coverage for the company's employees. 
4. I made the decision to retain Gem State Mutual of 
Utah as the company's insurer due to the fact that my brother, 
Glen Billings, was the agent of Gem Mutual who submitted that 
company's bid. 
5. My decision to select Gem State as Plaza Cycle's 
insurer was not based upon any price difference between the 
bids offered by Blue Cross and by Gem State. 
olh-
DATED this O day of March, 1983. 
^ ^ ' 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
1983. 
DeLTLE BILLINGS 
0^~, day of Marchi 
My Commission Expires: 
S-'Z't-SS 
Residing in : 
SxM-Uk &whj 
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AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF OTAH ) 
) SS: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned, having been first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That he is the Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel for 
Deseret Mutual. 
2. That in his capacity as Corporate Secretary he is the custodian 
of the books and records of Deseret Mutual. 
3. That as Legal Counsel for Deseret Mutual he coordinates the 
legal affairs for the corporation. 
4. That in his capacity as Legal Counsel he has reason to know of 
the relationship of Deseret Mutual with companies who receive their insurance 
and other benefits from Deseret Mutual, and has knowledge as to the transac-
tions between Deseret Mutual and its participating employers concerning pre-
miums, contracts, policies and negotiations concerning those items. 
5. That Deseret Mutual is a mutual benefit association under the 
laws of the State of Utah, and is an association of employers. 
6. That the employers who make up the Deseret Mutual Benefit 
Association are companies having an ownership, control or close supervision 
relationship with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 
7. That Deseret Mutual was created to provide insurance and other 
employee benefits to the employees of the employers who make up the 
Association. 
8. That Beneficial Life Insurance Company is a member of the 
Deseret Mutual Benefit Association and has been a member from the time of 
creation of Deseret Mutual. 
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9. That Deseret Mutual has never bid for the health insurance 
business of Beneficial Life Insurance Company, but has provided it con-
tinuously from the date of creation of Deseret Mutual. 
10. That Deseret Mutual did not bid for the health insurance busi-
ness of Beneficial Life Insurance Company in December of 1982, nor was it 
requested to bid for such business. 
11. That the foregoing is true to the best of his knowledge. 
DATED this //Q^- day of March, 1983. 
V±ctvf N. Gibb 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /0 ^ day of 
March, 1983 
c =
^ ^ ^ 
Notary Public 
Residing a t : < ^ ? k T LAc^c Crr\ QTAU 
My Commission expires: 
^ r /3 /??5~ 
< 
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